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Abstract
This paper uses a heterogeneous rms model to scrutinize the alleged aim of Fair
Trade to help the most disadvantaged producers in developing countries. Incorpo-
rating important aspects of Fair Trade in a two-good heterogeneous rm model we
show that the more productive rms will join Fair Trade arrangements. Presum-
ing that the least advantaged producers are those with lowest productivity, it thus
appears that Fair Trade cannot live up to its expectations.
1 Introduction
Fair Trade can be best described as a movement that applies fairness principles in the
supply chain from poor local smallholders in developing countries to consumers in rich
developed countries. The concept is put to practice by Fair Trade Organizations (FTOs),
replacing middlemen in the supply chain and o¤ering long-term trading relationships.
Fair Trade has known a continuous world-wide growth over the past decades, both in
sales and volume (e.g. FLO, 2010). Sales of certied products grew by 483 percent from
1998, amounting to US$ 1.6 billion in 2005 (Raynolds and Long, 2007: 20-21). In less than
two decades, fair trade has grown from an obscure niche market to a globally recognized
phenomenon(Murray and Raynolds, 2007: 5).
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The aim of Fair Trade is to o¤er the most disadvantaged producers in developing
countries the opportunity to move out of extreme poverty through creating market access
under benecial rather than exploitative terms (Nicholls & Opal, 2005: 6). This is
accomplished by paying local producers a stable, guaranteed minimum price for decent
coverage of production and living costs, as well as by providing them with a development
premium for local projects to improve social, economic and environmental infrastructure.
FTOs charge higher prices for comparable products in rich consumer markets to facilitate
these above market payments.
Economic analyses of the impact of Fair Trade have concentrated on the claims FTOs
make, primarily regarding the alleged e¤ects on income levels of the targeted group and
the e¢ ciency by which this is reached. Theoretical contributions include analyses of the
distorting e¤ects of using price oors as a mechanism to increase local producersincomes
(Lindsey, 2004; LeClair, 2002), the e¢ ciency of fair trade as a vehicle of transferring
income to the poor (Yanchus and De Vanssay, 2003), the e¤ect privileged market access
for fair trade producers has on other producers, locally or abroad (Maseland and de Vaal,
2008), and the verdict that fair trade outperforms free trade in alleviating poverty in
developing countries (Maseland and de Vaal, 2002). Fair trade has also been assessed on
its potential to eradicate monopsony powers and other market imperfections in supply
chains (Hayes, 2006). Stähler and Richardson (2007) analyze the e¤ect of the supply
chain on fair trade supplierscompetitiveness. A rst comprehensive empirical study of
the e¤ects of fair trade on local incomes is given in Rueben (2008).
This paper uses a heterogeneous rms model to scrutinize the alleged aim of Fair Trade
to help the most disadvantaged producers in developing countries. We use the two-good
heterogeneous rm model version of Bernard et al. (2003) and incorporate important
characteristics of Fair Trade. In the model, producers decide whether to produce a Plain
Good (PG) or a Fair Trade (FT) good. PG production is the default for any rm entering
the market, but producers may switch to FT good production. Taking heed of the special
traits of the Fair Trade movement, we assume that FT production is di¤erent from PG
production in the following ways. First, FT products are produced by adhering to better,
yet also more costly production standards. On the other hand, FT producers receive
higher prices for their goods, which consumers of these products in rich countries are
willing to pay. Second, we assume that the decision to start producing FT goods is clouded
with some ambivalence on part of local producers. After all, entering a FT arrangement
will imply abandoning familiar production methods and producing for di¤erent markets.
We model these transition costs as an additional entry cost to the one that must be
incurred by any rm that wants to produce. Finally, since Fair Trade also provides for
a sustainable trading relationship, it makes it less likely that FT rms are hit by an
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unexpected negative shock. Accordingly, we assume that the stochastic survival rate of
FT rms is higher than for PG rms.
Our analysis shows that Fair Trade leads to a selection e¤ect and that it will be
the most productive rms that will join Fair Trade arrangements. The reason is that
the higher production costs make FT production only a more protable option than PG
production provided a rms productivity level exceeds some threshold level of indi¤erence.
As is standard in heterogeneous rms models, these rms will then also receive the highest
prots. Presuming that the least advantaged producers are those with lowest productivity,
it thus appears that Fair Trade cannot live up to its expectations. Furthermore, the
additional entry cost opposes a barrier to Fair Trade that matters most for the lowest
and least productive producers. The uncertainties involved with adapting to the di¤erent
standards of Fair Trade thus increase the selection e¤ect, moving Fair Trade even further
away from its goal. Fair Trade thus results in a paradox. When it succeeds in its inherent
workings better standards, secure trade channels, and so on the benets will go to the
better o¤, not to the least advantaged.
What is more, if the possibilities of Fair Trade are not known to producers in advance,
rms already producing benet disproportionately in the form of pure prots. In a setting
of poor developing countries with few and dispersed Fair Trade operations, this is not
an unlikely scenario. The information e¤ect arises because upon deciding to start up
production, rms form false expectations regarding future prots. New rms weigh the
initial entry cost against the net present value of future prots, but are unaware that
these could be higher due to fair trade production. As a consequence, fewer rms will
nd it protable to enter and excess prots for incumbent rms result, for FT rms and
PG rms alike. Which category benets the most depends on the strength of the selection
e¤ect. A higher selection threshold implies less FT rms and hence a lower share of pure
prots for existing FT rms.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the key aspects of
fair trade for the demand and supply relations in a heterogeneous rms model. Section 3
elaborates on the entry and exit decisions of rms in view of fair trade posibilities. Section
4 discusses equilibrium focussing on the importance of having prior information on fair
trade for outcome. Section 5 concludes.
2 Modelling Fair Trade and heterogeneous rms
Key to the success of Fair Trade is that some consumers have a preference for a category
of products produced by a higher standard, willing to pay higher prices for it. Other
consumers care less or are indi¤erent with respect to such fairness characteristics, seeing
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fair trade goods as any other good. We stylize this by assuming there are two categories
of goods fair trade goods and plain goods yielding di¤erent utility to di¤erent types
of consumers ethical consumers and ordinary consumers. We assume a xed division
of both types of consumers in society, with 0 < a < 1 being the share of ordinary
consumers and 1   a the share of ethical consumers.1 It is modelled as a demand shift
parameter: a higher value of a implies a smaller share of society has ethical preferences.
We therefore assume that either group of consumers has an absolute preference for either
of the goods categories: by assuming a to be xed, ethical consumers cannot become
ordinary consumers and vice versa (hence demand shift parameter ).
Both groupsconsumption adds to societal utility U in the following way:
U =

aCpg + (1  a)Cft
1=
; (1)
where Ci; i 2 fpg; ftg; is a consumption index of di¤erent varieties from either the plain
good category or the fair trade goods category and where  is the CES substitution
parameter. This way of modeling is similar to the utility function of Bernard et al.
(2003)2.
For any other value than 0:5, the demand shift parameter provides asymmetry in utility
from consuming products from a certain product category. The elasticity of substitution
between categories is  = 1=(1   ) > 1. The elasticity of substitution is important
since even though consumers have absolute ideas on which category of goods they prefer,
actual consumption also depends on prices. The relative size of the two groups in society
is not su¢ cient for fully conceptualizing fair trade demand of consumers; the elasticity of
substitution completes the picture.
Each product category consists of a multitude of varieties, indicated by the consump-
tion index C:
Ci =
24 Z
!
i
ci(!)
d!
351= ;
where ci(!) is consumption of specic variety ! within the full set 
i of varieties of
category i 2 fpg; ftg produced. Varieties within a category are imperfect substitutes, with
elasticity  = 1=(1   ) > 1. To focus on the di¤erence in categories, preferences within
a category are assumed to be constant and equal for both categories. In other words, the
attractiveness of alternative varieties within a product category is constant and the same
1The assumption that a is between 0 and 1 is necessary for having both categories produced.
2Though Bernard et al. (2003) speak of a representative consumer. Bernard et al. (2010) assume
consumers have a preference between many di¤erent categories and many varieties (products). For our
purposes it su¢ ces to only model preferences for two types of products though.
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for ethical and ordinary consumers. Furthermore, we will make the standard assumption
that the elasticity within a category is larger than the elasticity across categories:   >
0.3
We denote the price a consumer pays for a product variety by pi(!), The price index
of a particular category of goods becomes:
Pi =
24 Z
!
i
pi(!)
1 d!
351=1  : (2)
Consumers of either category maximize their utility by spending
ri(!) = Ri

pi(!)
Pi
1 
(3)
on each variety !. In this expression, Ri = Ci Pi denotes overall spending on a particular
category. UsingR = Rpg+Rft to denote total expenditures in society, CES-utility function
(1) implies:
Rft
R
=
 
1 a
a
 Pft
Ppg
1  
1 +
 
1 a
a
 Pft
Ppg
1  = K1 +K (4)
with K dened as
 
1 a
a
 Pft
Ppg
1  
. The expenditure share of plain good products is
then 1=(1+K). The importance of the demand shift parameter a in determining societal
expenditure on fair trade goods is clear since dRft=da < 0: the expenditure share of fair
trade goods increases when a larger share of consumers value fair trade products (lower a).
Whats more, (4) also reects that the preference for the fair trade good is the willingness
to pay more for the fair trade good: to keep fair trades expenditure share constant, a
higher share of ethical consumers in society (da < 0) must go together with a higher price
index for fair trade goods:
dRft = 0() (1  a) da
a
=
(1   )
 
dPft
Pft
:
Also on the supply side, Fair Trade has implications. For instance, the desire of
Fair Trade to o¤er better trading conditions does imply some extra constraints on local
producers. Requiring certain standards of production is just one of these constraints.
3Even though we analyze a situation in which ethical consumers are present, we still believe this
assumption holds. It is at least consistent with the extreme position in which ethical consumers would
not be willing to susititute fair trade goods for plain goods at all ( ! 0). A more serious concern
therefore would be the assumed symmetry in preferences across types of consumers. Most likely,     
will have a di¤erent value for ethical consumers than for ordinary consumers, an issue we will ignore.
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Other constraints involve becoming part of a cooperative in order to be able to benet
from the fair trade arrangement, implying additional organization and information costs.
Essentially then, becoming part of the Fair Trade production chain will be costly to rms,
a¤ecting variable and xed costs of production. On the other hand, there are also clear
benets involved. For instance, being part of a democratically organized cooperative yields
counterweight to monopsonic middlemen in the distribution chain of products, whereas
the provision of a direct channel to rich Western consumer markets saves distribution
costs. These benets, however, seem to relate more to the decision to enter the fair trade
arrangement, rather than a¤ecting production decisions directly (see the next section).
We therefore model fair trade as being more costly to produce than plain goods, using a
parameter s to mark the di¤erence (mnemonic for standard).
Accordingly, the production function for rms producing fair trade varieties and plain
good varieties is given by:
li('; s) =

f +
qi(')
'

si
for i 2 fpg; ftg and where we assume sft > spg > 0: The production function gives the
total amount of labour l that is required to produce output q of the variety the rm
produces. There are increasing returns to scale at the rm level due to a xed cost of
production f . The variable costs of production are normalized to one, but depend on the
productivity of the particular rm, denoted by ' > 0. Since sft > spg, a rm in fair trade
requires higher labour input than an equally productive rm in plain good production.
We will assume that once rms have decided for which category they will produce
their products, they cannot switch to the other category (see next section). By the
same token, we assume that rms that produce fair trade products cannot sell these
products without the Fair Trade label. Mixed-rm strategies are therefore ruled out. This
makes sense in view of the fact that fair trade production requires di¤erent standards and
organizational arrangements than plain good production, so that switching to a di¤erent
mode of production would require new xed costs.
We also assume that wages are equalized across sectors, assuming a perfectly working
labour market. The aspect of Fair Trade that it also pays (more) decent wages is included
by the higher price fair trade producers receive due to the higher labour standard, in
comparison to ordinary production. The wage rate will serve as numéraire in our model,
w = 1 henceforth.
Firm prots are given by
i = ri  

f +
qi(')
'

si
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and, using (3), prot maximization leads to the familiar outcome that price is a xed
mark-up over marginal cost:
pi(') =
1

si
'
: (5)
Ceteris paribus, the price for fair trade products is higher than for plain good products,
while within each product category, more productive producers charge lower prices. We
assume that these prices are c.i.f. prices for reaching foreign markets because that is
eventually the relevant comparison for local producers. Any di¤erence in costs of reaching
far away markets between fair trade and plain good producers could be easily incorporated,
but we ignore it because it would serve a similar function as the di¤erence in si.
Given the pricing rule, rm prots and rm revenue can be written as:
i =
ri(')

  fsi and ri(') = Ri

si
'Pi
1 
: (6)
As standard in the heterogeneous rm literature, rm revenues and prots are increasing
in productivity levels:
ri('
0)
ri(')
=

'0
'
 1
> 1;8'0 < '. (7)
As such, it is immediate that the least well-o¤among producers (in either category) would
be the least productive rms. Whether a rm of (low) productivity is better o¤ under
fair trade than under plain good production is not clear yet:
rft('
0)
rpg(')
= K 

'0
'
 spg
sft
 Pft
Ppg
 1
: (8)
However, for equal mass of fair trade rms and plain good rms, prots would be lower
for fair trade producers unless a large enough share of consumers has a preference for fair
trade goods:
rft('
0)
rpg(')
=
241  a
a
 
Mpg
Mft
  
 1 sft
spg
'
'0
1  35 (9)
for ' = '0 and where we used (2) and rmsoptimal pricing rule (5).
3 Productivity and the decision to enter Fair Trade
The essence of entry and exit of rms is as in standard heterogeneous rm models. That
is, rms learn about their productivity once they have entered the market and then
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decide to produce or not, depending on whether or not their productivity yields positive
prots. This basic mechanism is the same for all rms, irrespective of whether they end
up producing plain goods or fair trade goods. Though fair trade production has an ethical
concern, its main aspect is still protability (Nicholls and Opal, 2005; Moore, 2004). This
also applies to the decision of rms within which category of goods to produce. When a
rm knows its productivity, it will start weighing the advantages of becoming a fair trade
rm or not. Given a rms productivity, the comparison involves a comparison of future
prots of both production schemes. This is di¤erent from Bernard et al. (2003), where
the decision for which category to produce depends on single period prots. The reason is
that we will argue that fair trade production is characterized by a lower chance of death,
but also that it has additional entry costs. As we will show, this creates a gap between
the outcomes of a single period prot comparison, and a comparison based on expected
future prots. Since a rms productivity is held constant during its lifetime, once a rm
has chosen for a particular production mode there is no incentive to switch back.
It is also standard in the heterogeneous literature rms to assume that rms can be
hit by an exogenous shock leading to bankruptcy. The possibility of such a shock is
modeled into a probability of exit (i.e. chance of death) for rms (Melitz, 2003; Bernard
et al., 2003). We assume that the chance of facing a bad shock is smaller within the fair
trade category than within the plain good category. This may be because of fair trade
arrangements guarantee minimum prices or better access to nancial markets, but also
because fair trades aim is to engage in long-term relationships with local producers.
Letting 0 <  < 1 denote the chance of death for a plain good rm, we assume:
ft = Xd
with 0 < Xd < 1 fair trades relative chance of death.
However, becoming a fair trade rm also involves additional entry costs. A farmer
choosing to join the cooperative will forfeit on its standard way of producing. Especially
for farmers who can barely survive this may be too much of a risk to take, by lack of
suitable fall-back options (Nicholls &Opal, 2005). The risk of switching is a consequence of
leaving the classical buyer system, which despite its drawbacks at least provides certainty.
The monopsonic buyer in the classical system visits the farmer once a year and the
question that lies ahead for the farmer is, will the new cooperation follow through on
the promises made, will it be a trustworthy partner? Furthermore, switching implies
changing production methods, for instance towards more sustainable ways of production.
Finally, it would imply switching from growing a crop that your grandfather grew to
a higher-priced crop that no one in your village has ever grown before (ibid: 19). We
model these uncertainty costs as an additional entry costs eft that must be faced by each
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farmer that decides to become a fair trade producer. The fair trade entry costs should
be seen separately from the general market entry costs e, also timewise. However, both
entry costs have in common that they become sunk once incurred.
The sequence of entry and exit is then as follows. Before a rm starts up it must pay
an entry cost e for becoming a rm. The rm then learns about its productivity level and
either quits for having a too low productivity level or stays as either a plain good rm or
as a fair trade rm, the latter depending on a trade-o¤ between a lower chance of death
and additional entry cost. The decision to enter the market and which type of goods to
produce can then be seen as a three-step procedure. Before nding out their productivity
level, each potential entrant calculates an expected value of future earnings, which is a
probability-weighted average of the potential earnings of becoming a plain good rm and
a fair trade rm. The actual decision which type of rm to become is made after a rm
has learned about its productivity. Then it may also decide to exit the market, which
will happen when it nds out that is has a too low productivity level to earn positive
prots. We therefore see entrant rms as rational entities that are able to make all sorts
of what-if calculations, basing the decision what to produce on a comparison between their
actual productivity level (which they nd out about once they have incurred the entry
costs) and the what-if schemes they constructed. Though this may seem too far-fetched,
especially in a developing country setting, it aligns the analysis to standard practice in
the heterogeneous rms literature.
The rst calculation is to list under what conditions production will be protable.
Irrespective of the category a rm will choose, rms must earn non-negative prots. This
denes a production indi¤erence value of productivity ' for either category below which
rms would not produce:
ri('

i )

 fsi (10)
for i 2 fpg; ftg. This is the standard outcome that operational prots should at least be
equal to a rms xed cost of production. A priori it is not clear which category has the
lowest value of '. Though for low enough levels of productivity we know that ft < pg
must hold by virtue of ft(0) =  fsft < pg(0) =  fspg it depends on the elasticity of
prots with respect to ' which category shows positive prots rst. As will be explained
below however, it must be that 'ft > '

pg.
The second calculation is to determine conditions that make it protable to produce
fair trade goods rather than plain goods or vice versa. Once a rm knows its produc-
tivity, and provided the protable production condition (10) holds, this decision depends
on whether the expected di¤erence in future prots between fair trade and plain good
production is equal or higher to the additional entry costs of fair trade. Expected future
9
prots are obtained by taking the net present value of all future prots, correcting for the
chance of death:4
Fpg('  'pg) =
1

pg(') and Fft('  'ft) =
1
ft
ft('): (11)
Let ' represent the value of productivity where the di¤erence between future prots
of a fair trade rm and that of a plain good rm is just equal to the cost for entering
the fair trade market. This marks the point of indi¤erence for a rm between production
methods, yielding a category indi¤erence productivity value:5
ft('
) = Xdpg(') + fteft: (12)
The di¤erence in chance of death lowers the required di¤erence in prots for being in-
di¤erent between production methods (Xd< 1), the higher entry costs raises it.6 The
non-deductable character of the additional entry cost means that it is not part of the sin-
gle period prot function therefore eft is presented as a separate term in the comparison
between future prots. A lower chance of death for a fair trade rm has a similar e¤ect
as a higher productivity level in the sense that it makes it easier to pay the entry cost for
fair trade production.
Given that there are preferences for ordinary goods and for fair trade goods in society,
equilibrium requires that both product categories must be produced. This puts constraints
on the cut-o¤ points identied in (10) and (12). First, it helps explain why it must be
that 'ft > '

pg. Suppose, for argumentss sake, that the ordering is reversed. This implies
that the elasticity of fair trade prots with respect to ' must be higher than that for
plain good prots. Any rm with 'ft < ' < '

pg would then become a fair trade rm
since its productivity would fall short of protable plain good production. Moreover since
ft < , the elasticity of future prots of fair trade rms will exceed that of plain good
rms by more . Consequently, fair trades future prots would always be higher and also
rms with productivity 'ft < '

pg < ' would not decide to become plain good rms.
7.
This is di¤erent if instead 'ft > '

pg holds. as a similar line of reasoning would reveal.
With plain goods always be produced rst, from now on we dene 'pg  ' and denote
the general entry cost as those for entering as a plain good rm: e = epg.
4In line with Melitzoriginal model, time discounting of future prots is not implemented as the chance
of death has qualitatively a similar e¤ect (Melitz, 2003: 1702).
5We assume that in the case of equal protability, the rm will become a fair trade rm.
6The additional entry cost consists of additional risk but it is directly compared with prots. This
is easier than expressing the entry costs in units of risk and add a risk to prot conversion parameter.
With this method the important qualitative e¤ect yet to see remains: a threshold lies before fair trade
production. Such a threshold is absent in Bernard et al. (2003).
7Unless the additional entry cost of fair trade would be extremely high, as can be veried from our
graphical representation below.
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A su¢ cient condition for existence of ' is then that the elasticity of fair trade future
prots to ' exceeds that of plain good production. This requires:
dFft=d' > d
F
pg=d'() drft=d' >
ft

drpg=d'
which, using (6) and (4), is equivalent to:

ft

Pft
Ppg
  
spg
sft
 1
>

a
1  a
 
: (13)
For having fair trade production, there should be a preference for fair trade products and
the cost of producing fair trade must not be too high. The lower chance of death works
to increase the likelihood of having fair trade, as expected. The condition is consistent
with the formal requirement for 'ft > '

pg, see the appendix. Note also that if '
 exists,
it must be that: ' > ':
Proposition 1 To have both plain goods and fair trade produced in equilibrium requires
that the zero-prot cuto¤ productivity of plain good production 'pg is lower than the zero-
prot cuto¤ productivity of fair trade production 'ft and that condition (13) holds.
If condition (13) holds, there will be a value ' = ' beyond which rms prefer
to produce fair trade goods.8 This implies that high-productivity rms self-select in
becoming fair trade rms, whereas low productivity rms produce plain goods.
Proposition 2 When both types of goods are produced, rms with productivity ' < ' <
' will produce plain goods and rms with productivity ' > ' will produce fair trade
goods.
The situation that arises is depicted in Figure 1 below. The horizontal axis lays
out productivity levels, the vertical axis represents single period prots or future prots,
depending on the curve portrayed. These are the what-if schemes each potential entrant
calculates prior to learning its productivity. Figure 1 is drawn such that the single period
prot lines of the two categories already converge, which is however not required for the
8To see this formally, we evaluate relative future prots in this point. Let '0 > ', then for the
category indi¤erence condition (12) to be true, Fft('
0) > Fpg('
0):
1
ft
rft('
0)

  1

rpg('
0)

>
1
ft
fsft   1

fspg + eft:
Assuming (12) holds and using (6) to get rc('0)=rc(') = ('0=') 1, it follows that
'0
'
 1 
1
ft
rft('
)

  1

rpg('
)


>
1
ft
rft('
)

  1

rpg('
)

:
should hold, which is the case since '0 > '.
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analysis to hold. To have both categories produced, expected future prot lines must
converge though. They always start at c(') = 0 as rms with negative prots in a single
period go out of business. The di¤erence in slopes between future prot lines and single
period prot lines is due to the ratio of death. Given the di¤erence in chances of death,
the slope of future fair trade prots diverges more from the single period prot line than
the plain good variant. Entry costs for fair trade can be introduced by means of a shadow
line below Fft('), as if they were a one-time-for-all additional xed costs. The indi¤erence
productivity level ' is then at the intersection of this shadow line with Fpg('). This
point lies to the right of , and is for positive prots. Note however that actual prots
earned are not represented by the shadow line, since eft becomes sunk once it has been
incurred.
We also note that the productivity level that sustains fair trade production yields
higher single period prots for plain good producing rms: pg(') > ft('). This is
the consequence of including other elements than just di¤erences in production standards
for determining which product to produce. Moreover, the required positive jump in future
prots at ' represents the fact that one is careful about the switch to fair trade. On one
hand, the plain good producer faces lower prices but certainty, on the other hand there
is the uncertainty of switching, despite the outlook of a better price. Therefore when the
transition is made, prots must jump up. The di¤erence in single period prots at '
also marks the choice between certainty and protability: due to more certainty in future,
rms are willing to face lower prots today.
(Insert Figure 1 about here)
4 Equilibrium and information requirements
Given that entrants know what would be optimal to do once knowing their productivity,
they may calculate expected lifetime earnings and confront these with the entry cost
for starting up a rm, including the possibility of additional entry cost for fair trade
production. To make this assessment, rms need information on the probability of the
alternative options upon entry (direct exit, plain good production, fair trade production).
We rst deal with this in the standard fashion of the heterogeneous rm literature, as in
Melitz (2003), and then verify the consequences of not knowing about the possibility of
fair trade prior to entry. In a setting of poor developing countries with few and dispersed
Fair Trade operations, this is not an unlikely scenario.
We assume an ex ante probability density function of productivities g(') and asso-
ciated cumulative distribution function G('). It follows that the ex-ante probabilities
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of successful entry, plain good production and fair trade production are, respectively,
1   G('), G(')   G('), and 1   G('). Taking into account that the distribution
changes due to the exit of rms, the ex post probability distributions of productivities in
either category become:
('pg) =
g(')
G(') G(') and ('ft) =
g(')
1 G(') : (14)
This determines average productivity levels in each market, which can be used to
calculate aggregate variables. Average productivity only depends on the productivity
distribution g(') and the cut-o¤ points (Bernard et al. (2003):
~'pg('
; ') =

1
G(') G(')
Z '
'
' 1g(')d'
1= 1
(15)
~'ft('
) =

1
1 G(')
Z 1
'
' 1g(')d'
1= 1
(16)
where a tilde above a variable denotes average values. Since fair trade rms are rms
with ' > ' it follows that average productivity in fair trade is higher than in plain good
production: ~'ft > ~'pg.
With full information about all options available, prior to entry the expected value of
the rm is the probability weighted average of ~pg = pg(~'pg) and ~ft = ft(~'ft), taking
into account the respective chances of death. Entry stops when this value is equal to the
expected entry costs:
e =
G(') G(')

~pg +
1 G(')
Xd
~ft = epg + [1 G(')]eft. (17)
Since this model deals with two types of rms, the xed costs of entry are separated
between the inevitable general entry cost of becoming a (plain good) rm, and the entry
cost of becoming a fair trade rm. The latter carries a probability since only rms with
productivity higher or equal than ' will decide to become fair trade rms, which is not
clear ex ante.
As customary we will assume steady state equilibrium of entry and exit. This means
that for every type of rm that dies a similar kind of rm enters. Let Mpg and Mft be
the mass of rms of plain good rms and fair trade rms respectively, denoting entrants
to the market with Me. Steady-state equilibrium then implies
Mpg = [G('
) G(')]Me and XdMft = [1 G(')]Me: (18)
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The probalilities in (18) reiterate that rms decide on which type of rm to become after
they have entered.
The model is closed by assuming that the labor market clears. Labor is the sole
input in our model and all revenue earned must be paid to labor. Since the wage rate
was set to one (numeraire), this implies L = Le + Lp = R, where Le and Lp denote
labor used for entry and labor used in production, respectively. Total prots earned are
 = Mpg~pg +Mft~ft, which in equilibrium must match the costs of entry else more
rms would desire to enter. It therefore holds that:
Lp = R   and Le = :
Le includes the additional entry costs for those rms that decide to become a fair trade
rm:
Le =Meepg + [1 G(')]Meeft
and labour market equilibrium implies:
Mpg~pg +Mft~ft =Meepg +Me[1 G(')]eft: (19)
In the appendix we show that the model can be reduced to a system of four equations
that can be solved for the endogenous variables ', ', Ppg and Pft. Here we proceed by
discussing what happens when entrants would only learn about the possibility of engaging
in fair trade after they have entered as a plain good rm. This leaves the decision to stay
in the market and/or to become a fair trade rms in tact once rms have entered they
get to know that fair trade is an option but clearly it has consequences for the decision
to enter the market or not. Without knowing about the possibility of fair trade, the free
entry condition would become:
 0e =
G(') G(')

~0pg +
1 G(')

~0pg = epg. (20)
where we use a "0" to indicate variables that might change due to wrong information. The
notable di¤erence between (20) and the original free entry condition (17) is the absence of
average fair trade prots, as well as the absence of the expected entry costs of fair trade.
Moreover, average prots may change, depending on the implied changes in price indices.
The values for the cut-o¤ points ' and ' remain the same: the what-if schemes of
the previous section become known once rms have entered and found out about their
productivity.
Without prior knowledge of fair trade production possibilities the expected value of
a rm will decrease: v0e < ve. To see this it is key to understand that without the right
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information potential entrants will base their ex ante calculations on a version of Figure
1 that only includes (future) prots for plain good rms. Hence they believe protability
to be lower than it will actually be, expecting a lower mass of incumbent rms. To see
this formally consider Figure 2 below. The gure depicts the expected value of entry as
a negative function of the number of incumbent rms.9 The full information scenario
is depicted by M , at the intersection of ve and epg + (1   G('))eft. Having limited
information implies lower expected entry costs, and, as we will show, a lower value of the
rm. To make the argument we draw ve(~' = ') as a special case for the full information
scenario, giving the value of the rm if the net benet of fair trade to the average rm
just matches the additional entry cost. Logically, if fair trade does not bring additional
benets, the number of rms is invariant to having the right information or not. Hence,
the curves for the incomplete information scenario must also intersect at M 0. Since epg <
epg + (1 G('))eft, it must be that v0e < ve(~' = '), as depicted by the dashed lines.
Clearly, average productivity of fair trade will exceed ' and hence ve will be higher than
this borderline case, resulting in v0e < ve and M
0 < M:
(Insert Figure 2 about here)
The consequence is that when fair trade is not anticipated, fewer rms will enter the
market than is required for labor market equilibrium. With a xed overall labor supply,
this implies either unemployment of L   (L0e + Lp) > 0, or a decline in real wages that
ensures that Lp increases to match the decline in Le. In either case, the relative position
of laborers in society deteriorates. When unemployment arises this would manifest itself
through a portion of the labor force receiving no wage income at all, as well as through
excess prots that will arise for rms. With real wages unchanged Lp, R and  are the
same as before, implying   L0e > 0. When the adjustment occurs through a decline in
real wages, total prots fall to L0e, which matches the required entry costs. These adverse
e¤ects can be prevented by announcing the possibility of fair trade to potential entrants.
Proposition 3 Local labor markets will be adversely a¤ected by the existence of Fair
Trade if potential producers are not aware of the possibility of engaging in Fair Trade
arrangements prior to making their entry decisions.
5 Conclusion
The moment fair trade arrangements are introduced, the more productive rms in society
would want to switch to fair trade production. Though confronted with an additional
9Average prots decline in the number of rms: d~i=dPi = (   1)(~i + fsi)=Pi > 0 and dPi=dMi =
1
1 Pi=Mi < 0.
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entry cost, besides higher costs of production, for them the benets of a lower chance
of death for future prots are highest. Fair trade entails a clear selection e¤ect. While
reaching out to help the least well-o¤ in society, the rms attracted to the arrangement are
the larger, more productive rms. This conclusion is reached in a framework where rms
di¤er in their productivity and where Fair Trade is portrayed as a sustainable alternative
to ordinary production arrangements, both in terms of labor standards as well as in terms
of enduring partnerships. The paradoxical results is that when fair trade succeeds in its
inherent workings, the benets will go to the wrongset of producers. Whats more, when
the possibility of fair trade is not commonly known to new rms prior to entry, too few
rms will enter leading to a real wage decline and/or excess prots for incumbent rms.
To resolve these issues may require unorthodox measures. One solution would be to
set a maximum prot level for the FT rms FTOs want to work with. This would at
least make Fair Trade unattractive for the most productive rms around, though it is not
clear what it would imply for the level of productivity required to protably enter fair
trade arrangements. Another, more direct solution is to strengthen the admission criteria
to fair trade arrangements. FTOs may want to (re)consider which rms they allow to
enter the partnership. To counter the selection e¤ect a strong selection policy may be
warranted. Finally, FTOs could invest in reducing the entry costs to their partnerships by
providing assistance to local producers or by increasing the survival rate of FT producers.
In combination with a well-chosen prot ceiling, this would imply better access for low-
productive rms, while keeping the most productive out.
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A Mathematical derivations
A.1 Consistency of '-condition and 'ft > '

pg condition
To determine a condition for 'ft > '

pg, we use (8) and (10) to obtain:
rft('

ft)
rpg('pg)
= K 

'ft
'pg
 spg
sft
 Pft
Ppg
 1
=
fsft
fspg
=) '

ft
'pg
=
"
1  a
a
  
Pft
Ppg
  #1=( 1) 
sft
spg
=( 1)
Hence, 'ft > '

pg if: "
Pft
Ppg
  # 
spg
spft
 
>

1  a
a
 
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The condition for existence of fair trade production (13) can be written as:

ft|{z}
>1

sft
spg

| {z }
>1
>

a
1  a
 
Pft
Ppg
   
spg
sft
 
:
If 'ft > '

pg holds then the right-hand-side is at least twice the value of
 
a
1 a
 
. The
left-hand-side is clearly larger than one, as indicated. Both conditions are therefore not
inconsistent.
A.2 Model solution
To solve the model, we follow Bernard et al. (2003) in terms of procedure. First, we
substitute the expression for relative rm revenue (8) in the category indi¤erence condition
(12), using rpg(') = ('=') 1rpg(') from (7) and applying the zero-prot cut-o¤
condition (10). This yields:

'
'
 1
=
sft
spg
+
Xdeft
fspg
  ft

1  a
a
 
Pft
Ppg
  


spg
sft
 1
  ft

(A.1)
which is larger than one since ' > '. By (13) the denominator is positive. Disadvan-
tageous cost and price developments for fair trade production will increase the minimum
productivity requirement for becoming a fair trade rm relative to what it takes to prof-
itably enter the market.
The relative price index ratio can be expressed as:
Pft
Ppg
=

Mft
Mpg
1=1 
sft
spg
~'pg
~'ft
=
" R1
' '
 1g(')d'R '
' '
 1g(')d'
# 11 
sft
spg

1
Xd
 1
1 
(A.2)
where we applied (18) and the expressions for average productivity (15)-(16). Logically,
the price index ratio is increasing in fair trades relative labour standard by the xed
mark-up pricing rule. Likewise, a higher average productivity for fair trade products
decreases its relative price ratio. When fair trades relative chance of death Xd lowers,
its price ratio will decline because fewer rms will exit, ceteris paribus entry. We note
that with ' > ' and Xd < 1 it is not clear whether fair trade goods carry higher
prices, despite sft > spg. Though one of the central tenets of the fair trade movement is
that consumers pay higher prices for goods that are produced under fair circumstances,
the self-selection of high-productivity rms in fair trade arrangements makes that this is
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neither a necessary, nor required.
The next step is to express the (17) in relative prices and cut-o¤ points. Using (9),
(7), and (10), while applying the expressions for average productivity (15)-(16), we get:
~pg =
"
~'pg
'
 1
  1
#
fspg
~ft =
"
1  a
a
 
Pft
Ppg
  
spg
sft
 ~'ft
'
 1
  sft
spg
#
fspg:
Upon substitution, the free entry condition (17) becomes:
fspg

"Z '
'
"
'
'
 1
  1
#
g(')d'
#
+
fspg
Xd
Z 1
'
"
1  a
a
 
Pft
Ppg
  
spg
sft
 1
'
'
 1
  sft
spg
#
g(')d' (A.3)
= epg + eft
Z 1
'
g(')d':
Equilibrium conditions (A.1) and (A.2) combined determine a unique value of relative
goods prices and the relative cut-o¤ point.10 Together with equation (A.3) above and
with (19) in the main text, they solve for ', ', Ppg, and Pft.
10From equation (A.1) it follows that Pft=Ppg is monotonically declining in '=':  >  >
0, noting that the denominator of (A.1) is positive. It ranges from a value of Pft=Ppg =
[sft=spg +Xdeft=(fspg)]
1=(  )
[a=(1  a)] =(  ) (sft=spg)( 1)=(  ) > 0 when '=' = 1 to a lower
value of Pft=Ppg = Xd [a=(1  a)] =(  ) (sft=spg)( 1)=(  ) > 0 when '=' goes to innity. From
(A.2) it follows that Pft=Ppg is increasing in '=', ranging from zero if '=' approaches one to
innity if '=' approaches innity. This proof is in line with Bernard et al. (2003).
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Figure 1. Productivity cut-off points 
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Figure 2: Expected value of a firm 
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